Foreword—The United States Supreme Court’s “Environmental Term” (1991-1992) by Grad, Frank P.
Urban Law Annual ; Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law
Volume 43 A Symposium on the United States Supreme Court’s “Environmental Term” (1991-1992)
January 1993
Foreword—The United States Supreme Court’s
“Environmental Term” (1991-1992)
Frank P. Grad
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw
Part of the Law Commons
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open Scholarship. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Urban Law Annual ; Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law by an authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship.
For more information, please contact digital@wumail.wustl.edu.
Recommended Citation




FRANK P. GRAD *
This symposium collects, analyzes, and comments on the environ-
mental law decisions of the 1991-92 term of the Supreme Court. By its
nature, it is a miscellany on a variety of substantive and procedural
subjects having in common only that they are decisions by the highest
court of the land and that they deal with "environmental" subjects.
But in spite of their diversity, the cases analyzed tell us a good deal
about the current state of environmental law, as well as the current
attitude of the Court on this subject.
The field of environmental law is of relatively recent origin.
Although the law of conservation of natural resources finds its origin in
the period of President Theodore Roosevelt,' the modem field of envi-
ronmental law probably begins in the early or middle 1960s. Some
* Joseph P. Chamberlain Professor of Legislation, Director, Legislative Drafting
Research Fund, Columbia University School of Law. B.A., 1947, Brooklyn College;
LL.B., 1949, Columbia Law School.
1. The nation's system of National Forests, established under President Theodore
Roosevelt in 1905, provided the land for a number of national parks. For a brief ac-
count of the development of the national park and national forest system, see COUNCIL
ON ENVIRONMENTAL QuALrrY, THIRD ANNUAL REPORT 323-25 (1972). President
Theodore Roosevelt had a lasting impact on the conservation movement and on the
development of the public lands. He appointed conservationist Gifford Pinchot as Chief
of Forest Reserves who, under presidential auspices, managed to build up the reserves
from 40 million to 190 million acres. It is noted that "the conservation movement, one
of the parents of environmentalism, originated around timbering." The forest reserves,
established in 1891, expanded significantly during Theodore Roosevelt's presidency and
were renamed National Forests in 1907. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,
SixTH ANNUAL REPORT 220 (1975). President Theodore Roosevelt also assisted in
establishing the National Wildlife Sanctuaries, designating the first such sanctuary, Peli-
can Island, Florida, in 1903. Id. at 258. For a discussion of early developments of
National Forests and National Parks, see FRANK P. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRON-
MENTAL LAW § 12.01[3], at 12-14 to 12-18, § 12.03[1], at 12-59 to 12-83 (1992).
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place its beginning precisely on May 1, 1970, when the first Earth Day
was celebrated in a circus atmosphere. Others find its genesis in the
February 10, 1970 Presidential Message on the Environment or the
August 1970 Report of the Council on Environmental Quality.2 Inter-
est in environmental protection, however, clearly began earlier. In
1962, Rachel Carson published the book, Silent Spring. In 1965, the
Second Circuit decided the Scenic Hudson3 case, which first estab-
lished standing for persons with environmental, noneconomic interests.
Several other decisions in the 1960s protected scenic and aesthetic in-
terests.' In addition, a number of early federal and state laws protected
against water and air pollution,5 though these earlier laws were some-
what rudimentary and lacked firm enforcement provisions. The first
environmental law courses in American law schools appeared around
1969.
Although the development of environmental law owes a great deal to
the earlier environmental movement, it did not become a major part of
the nation's political agenda until the 1970s. Important early federal
legislation included the 1970 Clean Air Act,6 the National Environ-
mental Policy Act, which became effective in 1970,' and the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972.8 This sketchy ac-
count of the history of the development of environmental law and the
2. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, FIRST ANNUAL REPORT 25471
(1970). Following Earth Day 1970, new courses and new environmental careers devel-
oped at campuses across the country. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,
THIRD ANNUAL REPORT 337 (1972).
3. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Comm'n, 354 F.2d
608, 616 (2nd Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
4. For early environmental law cases, see Frank P. Grad & Laurie R. Rockett, En-
vironmental Litigation - Where the Action Is? 10 NAT. RESOURCES J. 742 (1970). The
1970 article states that real advances in environmental law must await the passage of
legislation that will provide an adequate basis for the protection of the environment
through litigation.
5. FRANK P. GRAD, ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL, PRIORITIES, POLICIES AND THE
LAW, 49-65, 117-27 (1971).
6. Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970). The Act was named Clean Air
Amendments of 1970, amending the 1963 Clean Air Act. For a discussion of early
developments, see GRAD, supra note 1, at 2-64 to 2-76.
7. Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 42 U.S.C.).
8. Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 33 U.S.C.). For references to earlier federal water legislation, see GRAD, supra note
1, § 3.03[l][a], at 3-71 to 3-87.
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following references to some of its features may help place the work of
the current Supreme Court in its proper light.
Environmental law reflects the confluence of two developments.
One is the legislative support for the conservation of natural resources,
including our natural heritage, scenic values, and other aspects of our
"quality of life." The other is the support for public health legislation
aimed at protecting against water and air pollution and the conse-
quences of the careless dissemination of hazardous substances and haz-
ardous waste. Both of these concerns, one focused on the protection of
the great outdoors, the other on city and industrial problems, have con-
siderable political support and provide an active political agenda for
the nation.
Because environmental concerns are general concepts not limited to
specific parts of the population, standing to raise environmental issues
was an early part of the law's development, and continues to be a litiga-
ble issue because it still controls environmentalists' access to the
courts.9
Environmental legislation pioneered the development of the citizen
suit, which has since become a feature of other significant fields, includ-
ing the field of civil liberties. Congress granted concerned citizens the
right to vindicate public interests in the environment by facilitating cit-
izen suits against the head of agencies to compel them to carry out
nondiscretionary duties under the law. Congress considered citizen
assistance to public enforcement so important that in every citizen suit
authorization it also added an authorization for the recovery of attor-
ney fees and expert witness fees.10
Other aspects of environmental legislation addressed ever present is-
9. See, ag., Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990); Duke Power Co.
v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S.
727 (1972); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Comm'n, 354
F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1965). For discussion of standing in
NEPA cases, see GRAD, supra note 1, § 9.04[2][a] at 9-236 to 9-244.
10. GRAD, supra note 1, § 14.02, at 14-4 n.5, § 14.02, at 14-5 to 14-16. The au-
thor's discussion of citizen suits lists 17 environmental statutes that contain authoriza-
tions of attorney fees and expert witness fees. The account also refers to the legislative
history of some of this legislation. The Senate Report discussing the 1971 Clean Air
Act, for instance, stated that "courts should recognize that in bringing legitimate ac-
tions under this section, citizens will be performing a public service and in such in-
stances the court should award costs of litigation to such party." S. REP. No. 1196,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1970). Similar purposes were expressed in the legislative his-
tory of the Equal Access to Justice Act. H.R. REP. No. 120, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 4,
reprinted in 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. 132, 132-33.
1993]
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sues of an intergovernmental nature. Because pollution is a national
problem and not defined by local or state boundaries, legislation must
address a variety of intergovernmental problems" and compliance is-
sues. 2 Both national and state regulations are likely to be involved in
environmental regulation, and thus issues of preemption 13 - as well as
issues of sovereign immunity a - assume particular importance.
In the early development of environmental law, the courts in gen-
eral, and the Supreme Court in particular, followed Congress' lead by
exercising their powers so as to protect environmental interests against
abuses by the executive department and its agencies. The environmen-
tal movement had long regarded the administrative agencies as being
co-opted by developmental interests; that is, by the very interests they
were supposed to regulate.' 5 Thus, the early efforts of environmental
lawyers focused on resolving environmental problems and protecting
the environment in the courts, rather than in administrative agencies.
16
The array of recent Supreme Court cases is an indication of the re-
cent changes in the field. The environmental law has matured, and it is
unlikely that recent reversals of environmental protection in the
Supreme Court are likely to last for long. Yet, these "reverses" indi-
cate a new low in the development of environmental protections. This
symposium discusses in detail nine decisions. While one must guard
against easy result-oriented judgments, it is impossible to ignore that in
this entire array of cases there is not a single decision that protects the
environment.
The Court does not favor citizen suits and citizen intervention. It
11. E.g., Federal Water Pollution Control Act, § 401, 33 U.S.C. § 1341 (1972) (dis-
cussing the impact of federal permits and construction on state water quality); id.
§ 1312 (adjusting the federal effluent limitations to meet state water quality standards);
42 U.S.C. § 7410 (1970) (stipulating state implementation plans to meet national ambi-
ent air quality standards); id. § 7426 (1977) (discussing interstate pollution abatement).
12. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7415 (1976) (discussing impact of U.S. pollution on public
health in foreign countries). See generally GRAD, supra note 1, § 2.05, at 2-556 to 2-
576.
13. See, e.g., City of Milwaukee v. Illinois and Michigan, 451 U.S. 304 (1981) (hold-
ing that Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972 preempted federal common law
nuisance); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7521 (preempting new motor vehicle emission
standards).
14. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7418 (detailing enforcement of pollution control require-
ments on federal facilities).
15. JOSEPH L. SAW, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT 63-107 (1971).
16. Id. at 108-124; David Sive, Some Thoughts of an Environmental Lawyer in the
Wilderness of Environmental Law, 70 COLUM. L. Rxv. 612, 614 (1970).
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has limited earlier standing rules,17 making it more difficult for envi-
ronmentalists to take their cases to court. The Court has also discour-
aged citizen suits by limiting the legal fees which may be recovered by
successful environmental litigants."i It has also limited the application
of federal legislation geographically, so as to limit the impact of such
legislation as the Endangered Species Act (ESA) and of the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), disallowing their extraterritorial
impact.19
Except for the application of its "clear statement rule,",20 this Court
holds no brief for legislative supremacy. In the interpretation of legis-
lation, it prefers deference to the administrative agencies - to the exec-
utive branch. It also prefers deference to the work of examining
congressional intent.21 This preference for executive rather than legis-
lative choices is demonstrated in decisions protecting sovereign immu-
nity in violation of the clear congressional mandate.22
The Court no longer holds the doctrine of separation of powers in
high regard. In addition to cases that show a clear preference for exec-
utive rather than legislative policy judgment,23 the Court currently ap-
proves and whitewashes congressional interference with judicial
procedures by way of an appropriation rider, undoing decisions sup-
porting natural resources and the environment in favor of the special
interests of the timber lobby.2
4
17. See infra pp. 13-18, for a discussion of Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct.
2130 (1992); George C. Coggins & John W. Head, Beyond Defenders: Future Problems
of Extraterritoriality and Superterritoriality for the Endangered Species Act, infra pp. 59-
84.
18. See infra pp. 29-30, for a discussion of City of Burlington v. Dague, 112 S. Ct.
2638 (1992); Michael D. Axline, Decreasing Incentives to Enforce Environmental Laws:
City of Burlington v. Dague, infra pp. 257-74.
19. See supra note 12.
20. See, e.g., Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 825 (1980); Note, Intent, Clear
Statement, and the Common Law: Statutory Interpretation in the Supreme Court, 95
HARV. L. REv. 892, 910 (1982).
21. See infra pp. 21-23, for a discussion of Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 112 S. Ct. 1046
(1992); Robert L. Glicksman, Watching the River Flow: The Prospects for Improved
Interstate Water Pollution Control, infra pp. 119-76.
22. See infra pp. 26-28, for a discussion of U.S. Dep't of Energy v. Ohio, 112 S. Ct.
1627 (1992); Robert V. Percival, Overcoming Interpretative Formalism: Legislative Re-
versals of Judicial Constructions of Sovereign Immunity Waivers in the Environmental
Statutes, infra pp. 221-56.
23. See supra notes 21 and 22.
24. See infra pp. 12-13, for a discussion of Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Robertson, 112
1993]
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The Court's view of the unimportance of environmental protections
is also demonstrated in its preemption decisions, where federal preemp-
tion works to defeat state environmental initiatives and protects devel-
opmental or property interests,2" or to use protective legislation to
block rather than to advance litigation that seeks damages for the very
harms the law seeks to prevent.2 6 Preemption cases indicate a prefer-
ence for the use of federal power particularly where the exercise of the
state's police power would provide greater environmental protection at
the expense of property interests.27 Similar results occur when the
Court disregards precedent and labels the exercise of state police power
to protect the environment, public health, and safety as a regulatory
taking.
28
A recurring aspect of last term's environmental output by the
Supreme Court is its pedestrian and dispassionate quality. The opin-
ions of the Court should be nonpartisan, but they need not be dull and
uninspired. Their tone and their content evidence judicial languor and
a desire to avoid hard and searching inquiry. Again and again, the
Court chose easy, superficial, mechanical responses over searching and
analytical ones. This symposium shows the analytical and creative
work the Court could have done had it not taken the easy road, and
had it chosen to involve itself more intensely and in a less predictable
S. Ct. 1407 (1992); Michael C. Blumm, Ancient Forests and the Supreme Court: Issuing
a Blank Check for Appropriation Riders, infra pp. 35-58.
25. See Gade, Director of Illinois Envtl. Protection Agency v. National Solid Waste
Management Ass'n, 112 S. Ct. 2374, 2381-88 (1992) (holding that the OSHA preempts
a state licensing act which regulates occupational health and safety); Chemical Waste
Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 112 S. Ct. 2009, 2012-17 (1992) (holding that the State's
additional fee requirement to dispose of hazardous waste generated in other states vio-
lates the Commerce Clause); Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of
Natural Resources, 112 S. Ct. 2019, 2023-28 (1992) (holding the State's differential
treatment for health purposes of solid waste generated outside of the disposal site's
county violated the Commerce Clause); see also infra pp. 177-220, Michael P. Healy,
The Preemption of State Hazardous and Solid Waste Regulations: The Dormant Com-
merce Clause Awakens Once More. See also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct.
2130, 2137-46 (1992) (holding there was no standing for petitioners to challenge the
scope of ESA to protect endangered species threatened by U.S. funded projects abroad).
26. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2616-21 (1992); see also
Allan Kanner, Federal Tort Law in the Regulatory Age, infra pp. 275-98.
27. See supra note 25.
28. See Yee v. City of Escondido, 112 S. Ct. 1522, 1528-31 (1992); Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2892-95 (1992); see also Richard M. Frank,
Inverse Condemnation Litigation in the 1990s - the Uncertain Legacy of the Supreme
Court's Lucas and Yee Decisions, infra at 85-118.
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fashion. As this symposium shows, a great deal of the Court's past
work will have to be redone, perhaps sooner rather than later.
THE PREEMPTION OF STATE ENVIRONMENTAL AND
OCCUPATIONAL PROTECTIONS BY THE FEDERAL
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT
In Gade, Director Illinois Environmental Protection Agency v. Na-
tional Solid Waste Management Ass'n,29 a trade association represent-
ing all major hazardous waste disposers brought an action for
declaratory judgment and to enjoin the Illinois Environmental Protec-
tion Agency from enforcing two Illinois laws that provide for the li-
censing of hazardous waste site workers. As a condition for the state
license, the Illinois laws required employees to undergo training and
proficiency testing and to have extended work experience. The ques-
tion before the Court was whether the federal Occupational Safety and
Health Act (OSHA) preempted the Illinois statutes. The district court
held that it did not. The court of appeals affirmed in part, vacated in
part, and remanded. On certiorari, the Supreme Court, in a plurality
opinion by Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices White and Scalia, with Justice Kennedy concurring in result,
found that OSHA preempted the state law. The plurality rejected the
argument that the State's statutes should be upheld because they ad-
dressed not only workplace safety but also general public protection.
The plurality opinion found neither field preemption nor specific
conflict with federal law. However, it did find implied preemption af-
ter considering whether a state law that merely sought to supplement
the federal act could be preempted by it. In Justice O'Connor's view,
the law allowed state action legislation on subjects covered by OSHA
only with the approval of the Secretary pursuant to section 18(b) of the
Act. Because the state had not sought such approval, the supplemental
state law was preempted, though no showing had been made of any
direct conflict with the federal law.
The Court also held that the Illinois legislation violated federal pre-
emption because Illinois cannot regulate worker health and safety
under the guise of environmental regulation. The Court noted that the
requirement of 4,000 hours of experience could not survive preemption
simply because the rule might also enhance public health and safety.
29. 112 S. Ct. 2374 (1992).
1993]
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The Court failed to explain why a sound rule of occupational health
and safety, if not preempted, may not also protect public health.
The dissent, Justice Souter, joined by Justices Blackmun, Stevens
and Thomas, relied heavily on the presumption against preemption,
and, after examining the legislative history, concluded that OSHA con-
tained no express intention to preempt state law. Indeed, the Act an-
ticipated supplementary state regulation. The very requirement of
approval of state legislation on occupational safety and health by the
Secretary indicates that Congress did not intend to preempt the field,
nor did Congress refuse to accept state provisions that did not conflict
with supplemented OSHA requirements. The dissent avoided the pre-
emption issue by relying on OSHA section 18(a), which allows state
law jurisdiction over occupational safety or health issues in the absence
of an applicable federal standard under section 655. Indeed, there is
nothing in section 18(a) that is inconsistent with the conclusion that as
long as compliance with both the federal standard and the state regula-
tion is not physically impossible, each of these standards is enforceable.
This conclusion is supported by the normal presumption against pre-
emption and by earlier decisions." By its own terms, the only effect of
the provision authorizing the Secretary to approve state law provisions
is to prevent the Secretary from approving provisions that would un-
duly burden interstate commerce. The dissenters disagreed with the
majority in its contention that the Illinois law was an effort to enact
occupational safety and health requirements under the guise of enact-
ing environmental law.
The uncertain resolution of the preemption issue is illustrated in Jus-
tice Scalia's concurrence, which disagreed with the plurality and found
that OSHA is expressly preemptive of state law.
The Court's preemption decisions indicate a clear preference for fed-
eral power, particularly when the exercise of the state's police power
provides greater environmental protection at the expense of property
interests. Prior to Gade, the Court upheld two cases involving a state
ban on the disposal of out-of-state waste. The first case involved a state
law that clearly imposed a discriminatory exaction on out-of-state com-
30. United Steelworkers of Amer., AFL-CIO-CLC v. Auchter, 763 F.2d 728, 733-
36 (3rd Cir. 1985). In Auchter, the court granted protection to more stringent state
regulation against preemption by imposing less effective federal requirements. The deci-




merce.31 In a subsequent decision, the Court held that a regulatory
scheme that only incidentally affected out-of-state waste disposers bur-
dened interstate commerce. Both hazardous waste disposal decisions
resulted in the protection of the interests of major disposers in search
of disposal sites.32
In the instant federal-state situation, in the Gade case in which pre-
emption was hardly clear, the outcome again adversely affects environ-
mental protection, as well as interests in occupational safety and
health. In the hazardous waste disposal cases, the decisions resulted in
the protection of interests of major disposers in search of disposal sites.
In Gade the decision resulted in the protection of major commercial
waste disposal interests against substantial cost increases which would
have resulted from the application of the Illinois legislation. The legis-
lation was police power regulation, designed like OSHA and CERCLA
to protect the public health.3 3
31. Chemical Waste Management v. Hunt, 112 S. Ct. at 2011-12.
32. Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources,
112 S. Ct. at 2027-28.
33. The primary public health emphasis of CERCLA as amended by the Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-50, is evi-
dent from the high priority given to response actions to protect drinking water supplies.
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, 42
U.S.C. § 9618 (1986). This emphasis on public health protection is also reflected in the
amendment to CERCLA § 104(i) requiring the completion of treatment necessary to
restore ground and surface water quality to a level that assures protection of human
health and the environment. Similar public health emphasis is evident in the expansion
of the authority and functions of the Agency for Toxic Substance and Disease Registry
(ATSDR). ATSDR administrators collect toxicological information to determine spe-
cific impacts of toxicity on different aspects of human health. ATSDR also performs
far-reaching public health assessments to determine the appropriate action to protect
the exposed population. The entire effort to clean up hazardous waste sites and to ex-
pend billions of dollars for this purpose is justified on public health grounds. Indeed,
CERCLA itself, as amended by SARA in § 104(a)(1), adds a broad directive to give
primary attention to those releases that the President deems may present a public health
threat.
The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA), Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84
Stat. 5090 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.), contains the follow-
ing congressional findings and purposes:
(a) Congress finds that personal injuries and illnesses arising out of work situa-
tions impose a substantial burden upon and are a hindrance to interstate commerce
in terms of lost production, wage loss, medical expenses and disability compensa-
tion payments.
(b) Congress declares it to be its purpose and policy, through the exercise of its
power to regulate commerce among the several States and with foreign nations and
to provide for the general welfare, to assure so far as possible every working man
and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working conditions and to preserve
1993]
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THE NATIONAL FOREST MANAGEMENT ACT, THE PROTECTION OF
OLD GROWTH FORESTS, AND THE REVERSAL OF COURT
DECISIONS BY APPROPRIATION RIDER
In Ancient Forests and the Supreme Court: Issuing a Blank Check
for Appropriation Riders, Michael C. Blumm addresses the Court's
whitewash of the reversals of specific cases protecting old growth for-
ests by a major appropriation rider. A unanimous Court joined in the
first opinion written by Justice Thomas. Upholding the appropriation
rider, dubbed the Northwest Timber Compromise, was a decision that
was wrong and contrary to sound precedent on the amendment of sub-
stantive law by such riders. It also upheld a breach of the separation of
powers principle and sanctified the efforts of the timber lobby to ad-
vance the cutting of old growth timber at the expense of endangered
species protection.
The Northwest Timber Compromise represents an unusual kind of
legislative action. The Congress used an appropriation rider and lan-
guage that would not withstand analytical muster to allow the Forest
Service to yield to special interest pressure. Blumm's article makes a
significant contribution by considering the real history of the case,
rather than adhering to Justice Thomas' "sanitized" account.
Blumm's analysis is also important in showing that the Supreme Court
was dealing with a measure of very temporary effect and narrow appli-
cation. There was no overwhelming need for the Supreme Court to
intervene, except to point the way for future congressional interference
in the decision of pending cases. In view of the limited impact of the
narrow decision in Seattle Audubon Society v. Robertson 34 and the
question of why the court granted certiorari, one surmises that the
opinion was assigned to Justice Thomas because this was a situation in
which he could do relatively little harm.
While the impact of the decision is shortlived, its implication with
respect to interference with the normal management of public lands
and growing timber is potentially far reaching. Timber from public
lands accounts for about one-fourth of all timber produced in the
United States.35 Sale of this timber is controlled principally by the Na-
our human resources [to undertake a variety of measures to protect the safety and
health of workers in the workplace].
Id.
34. 112 S. Ct. 1407 (1992).
35. CARL MCFARLAND, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES AND THE PUBLIC LAND
86 (1969). See also COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, SIxTH ANNUAL RE-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol43/iss1/2
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tional Forest Service of the Department of Agriculture, the agency that
administers the National Forests. The Department of the Interior also
oversees timber sales through the Bureau of Land Management
(BLM).36 The National Forest Management Act37 restricts both the
scope and method of sale. The cutting must be consistent with forest
management plans based on multiple use, sustained yield principles,
taking into account outdoor recreation, open range, timber, watershed,
fish and wildlife, and wilderness values."8 Decisions prior to Robertson
carried out longstanding protective principles reflected by the National
Forest Management Act, and in particular, the protective principles
relating to wildlife protection. The Robertson decision disregarded this
tradition, at the expense of the protection of the Northern Spotted Owl.
The language of the Northwest Timber Compromise is largely dou-
bletalk, particularly the statement that the "management of the areas
according to subsections (b)(3) and (b)(5) of this section [which undo
earlier law] ... is adequate consideration for the purpose of meeting
the statutory requirements that are the basis for the consolidated
cases" listed by their specific case captions. The only part which is
clear is that the earlier decisions interpreting established law are set
aside, a breach of separation of powers clearly explained in Michael
Blumm's article.
STANDING To ASSERT THE EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF
THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,39 the Supreme Court in a plurality
opinion by Justice Scalia managed to inffict significant, though not fa-
tal, damage to standing rules in environmental cases. The opinion also
limits the prospects for the extraterritorial application of the Endan-
gered Species Act (ESA). In Beyond 'Defenders'." Future Problems of
Extraterritoriality and Superterritoriality for the Endangered Species
Act, George Cameron Coggins and John W. Head focus their attention
PORT 226 (1975) (noting that the United States holds approximately 44% of the grow-
ing stock of timber and 30% of the commercially useful timberland area).
36. BANZHAF & Co., STUDY OF PUBLIC LAND TIMBER POLICY 3-6 (Vol. 1 1969)
(on file with the author). The Forest Service sells timber pursuant to 16 U.S.C. § 1611.
The BLM sells timber pursuant to the Oregon and California Railroad and Coos Bay
Wagon Road Grant Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1181a (1988).
37. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-14 (1976).
38. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(e).
39. 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992).
1993]
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primarily on the latter issue. They do not agree with Justice Black-
mun's dissent, which accused the majority of a "slash and bum expedi-
tion through the law of environmental standing."'  The case involves
a challenge by citizens with a special interest in protecting endangered
species threatened by construction on the Aswan Dam in Egypt and in
the Sri Lankan Mahaweli Project. The United States Agency for Inter-
national Development, USAID, participated in the funding of both of
these projects. During the Carter administration, the Secretaries of In-
terior and Commerce, pursuant to the ESA, promulgated a joint regu-
lation providing that the obligation imposed by ESA section 7(a)(2)
should also apply to actions taken by U.S. agencies in foreign nations.
ESA section 7(a)(2) requires agencies to consult with the Secretary if
they undertake an action that may endanger or threaten a species. Af-
ter a change in administration, the regulation was amended so that
such consultation was necessary only for actions taken in the United
States or on the high seas. Defenders challenged the amended regula-
tion, asserting their interest in the protection of the endangered species
in foreign countries. They sought a judgment declaring the new regu-
lation in error as to geographic scope and an injunction to compel the
Secretary to promulgate a new regulation reflecting the earlier interpre-
tation of ESA. Plaintiffs in the case often traveled to the countries
involved and maintained a continuing interest in the protection of the
particular species, including the Nile crocodile and the Asian elephant.
The citizen parties asserted in their affidavits that they planned to re-
visit the area to pursue their continuing interest in the species involved.
On its face, the affidavits reflected the well accepted grounds for
standing established in 1972 in Sierra Club v. Morton.41 The Court,
however, found that the basis for standing was inadequate, because
there was no "immediate" damage to plaintiffs' interests by the pro-
posed construction. It seems that an immediate interest would have
been easier to demonstrate if plaintiffs had plane tickets in their posses-
sion for the return to the area.
Other grounds for rejection of standing include the failure to show
the necessary injury in fact to be actual and imminent and the failure of
redressability. The Court held that there was not a sufficient showing
that the issuance of an order to the Secretary would directly affect the
activities of USAID in providing support for the construction in the
foreign countries. The Court also noted that USAID only supplied a
40. Id. at 2160.
41. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
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fraction of the funding for the foreign projects. Moreover, the Court
rejected the "ecosystem nexus," an earlier acceptable grounds for
standing. Because the Supreme Court accepted the case on a motion
for summary judgment, the Court said that it was necessary for plain-
tiffs to meet a higher burden of proof on the standing issues than would
have been necessary on a preliminary motion on the pleadings. Fi-
nally, the Court rejected plaintiffs' claim for standing based on a "pro-
cedural injury," a basis for standing recognized in a number of NEPA
cases.
Justice Scalia took the occasion to analyze standing as based on sep-
aration of powers grounds. Going beyond the usual basis for standing,
the case or controversy requirement, Justice Scalia asserted that the
concrete injury requirement has a separation of powers significance.
"To permit Congress to convert the undifferentiated public interest in
executive officers' compliance with the law into an 'individual right'
vindicable in the courts is to permit Congress to transfer from the Pres-
ident to the courts the Chief Executive's most important constitutional
duty, 'to take care that the laws be faithfully executed.' "42 Justice
Scalia supports his doctrine with a series of decisions decided well
before the congressional authorization of citizen suits and the common
acceptance of the vindication of environmental rights by citizen plain-
tiffs. The logical extension of Justice Scalia's notion is to undercut the
enforcement of environmental law by citizen suits of any kind, because
all of them necessarily intrude upon the carrying out of executive func-
tions, an intrusion which Justice Scalia would prefer to prevent. Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and Thomas joined in Justice
Scalia's opinion.
Justice Souter joined Justice Kennedy and concurred in part and
concurred in the judgment. Justice Kennedy's opinion agrees that
plaintiffs failed to show sufficient injury to support a standing claim,
but indicates that he is not willing to foreclose the possibility that in
different circumstances the nexus theory might support a claim to
standing. In light of plaintiffs' failure to show injury, Kennedy would
not reach the issue of redressability. He also indicates his disagreement
with the majority's analysis of the basis for standing. Though he finds
that the citizen suit provision of the ESA does not establish an ade-
quate chain of consequences required to provide standing in this situa-
tion, he clearly does not want to limit Congress' power to authorize
42. 112 S. Ct. at 2145.
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citizen suits where the action is brought to preserve an actual stake in
the outcome.
Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment because he was not per-
suaded that Congress intended the consultation requirement in section
7(a)(2) of the ESA to apply to activities in foreign countries. He did
not agree, however, with the Court's conclusion that plaintiffs lacked
standing because the threatened injury to their interest in protecting
the environment and studying endangered species is not "imminent."
Moreover, Justice Stevens disagrees with the plurality's conclusion that
the injury is not "redressable" in this litigation. Instead, he concludes
that plaintiffs met the usual requirements to support standing. Stevens
argues, however, that the plaintiffs would lose on the merits since he
failed to find any specific support for the extraterritorial application of
the consultation mandate.
The dissent by Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice O'Connor, takes
issue with virtually all of the plurality's conclusions, particularly the
Court's requirement that the immediacy of harm be demonstrated by
providing detailed descriptions of future conduct. Justice Blackmun's
position challenges the plurality's assertion that the harm to the plain-
tiff is not immediate because they are not about to return to Egypt or
Sri Lanka in the near future. The rejection of the "ecosystem nexus" is
also scored with Justice Blackmun's reference to the earlier Lujan v.
National Wildlife Federation 43 decision, in which the Court required a
showing of specific geographic proximity when the harm alleged is the
visual enjoyment of nature. The dissent asserts that injury does not
depend on a litigant's failure to use the exact site where the challenged
harm, i.e., the slaughter of the animals, occurs." Justice Blackmun
also finds redressability because an order to the Secretary is likely to
result in compliance by other agencies such as USAID, unless it is as-
sumed that such agencies will be intentionally nonlaw-abiding.
The dissent is particularly critical of the plurality's rejection of
standing based on procedural rights. The dissent notes that failure to
enforce such rights will ultimately result in an accretion of power in
the hands of the executive at the expense of Congress, from which the
power originates. Justice Blackmun rejects the plurality's view as un-
duly formalistic in its reliance on inappropriate and outmoded
precedents.
43. 497 U.S. 871 (1990).
44. 112 S. Ct. at 2154.
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The opinions in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife are noteworthy for
their unusually nasty and meanspirited tone. The very sharpness of the
division between the plurality, the dissent, and the concurrences is
troublesome. Such a sharp and acrimonious division indicates a strong
desire to limit plaintiffs' rights in environmental law suits, reversing the
direction of the past twenty years.
In their article, Coggins and Head highlight the change of direction
in standing law following Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation .45 The
Court failed to find standing even though plaintiffs had met all of the
prior applicable tests in their affidavit. The authors note Justice
Scalia's hostility to all public interest litigation, as reflected in some of
his earlier writings. They also call attention to Justice Scalia's clear
purpose to elevate the power of the executive over that of Congress.
The Defenders of Wildlife case clearly evidences Justice Scalia's predi-
lections. However, these are difficult to understand in light of his for-
mer service as Solicitor General, where he contributed to revision of
the Administrative Procedure Act, allowing aggrieved parties to chal-
lenge administrative actions and determinations, largely waiving the
routinely-used sovereign immunity defense against such actions. 4
6
The decision on standing relieved the Court from addressing the is-
sues of territoriality and superterritoriality of the Endangered Species
Act, which forms the major topic of the article by Professors Coggins
and Head. Making short shrift of the assertion that such extraterritori-
ality improperly interferes with the sovereignty of other nations, they
indicate that the United States has regularly done so when sufficiently
important interests were involved. The United States has indeed con-
ditioned developmental support to grantee states on their adoption of
certain requirements and laws relating to family planning, security law,
export controls, protection of competition, and control of corrupt busi-
ness practices. Though there may be a presumption against the extra-
territoriality of U.S. law, this presumption is easily overcome by
evidence of congressional intent.
In their paper, Coggins and Head do the job the Supreme Court
avoided, showing the manner in which ESA could be expanded to ap-
ply extraterritorially in bilateral development situations, and to apply
45. National Wildlife Fed'n, 112 S. Ct. at 2142-46.
46. REPORT OF THE HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITrEE, H.R. Doc. No. 1656, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1976). See also Antonin Scalia, Sovereign Immunity and Nonstatu-
tory Review of Federal Administrative Action: Some Conclusions from the Public-Lands
Cases, 68 MICH. L. REv. 867 (1970).
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superterritorially, which would be involved in multilateral develop-
ment assistance. Using World Bank activities as the primary example,
the authors show that even though the World Bank is not a federal
agency or instrumentality, an imaginative interpretation of section 7 of
ESA can apply to U.S. participation in the multilateral development
banks. The authors show that if Congress chooses to extend the scope
of ESA, it can do so without encountering any legal barriers. As exam-
ples they note other conditionalities imposed in the U.S. assistance pro-
grams, based on acceptable policies with respect to abortion, human
rights, and freedom of the press. Conditionalities involving the expan-
sion of ESA are fully justified by such international declarations as the
Stockholm Declarations and other international expressions in favor of
environmental and species protection.
REGULATORY TAKINGS
In Inverse Condemnation Litigation in the 1990s - The Uncertain
Legacy of the Supreme Court's Lucas and Yee Decisions, Richard M.
Frank places the two most recent inverse condemnation cases decided
by the Supreme Court into the sequence of the Court's 1990 deci-
sions.47 His insightful analysis of the field, from physical takings to
regulatory takings, raises the same questions asked in the field of tak-
ings law but left unanswered by the Court. A unanimous Court de-
cided Yee v. City of Escondido.4" Plaintiff, a mobile home park owner,
asserted that a mobile home rent control ordinance and California's
mobile home residency law, two measures that limit a mobile home
owner from terminating or assigning the leasehold interest, amount to
a physical taking of his property. The Supreme Court unanimously
rejected the plaintiff's argument. In so doing, the Court rejected previ-
ous appellate decisions holding that certain rent controls did indeed
amount to a physical taking. The Court concluded that the challenged
ordinances were police power regulations of property rather than a
taking.
Not to anybody's surprise, the Court had greater difficulties with
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council. 9 In 1988, South Carolina
47. E.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987);
First Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. City of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304
(1987); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987). See GRAD, supra
note 1, § 10.01[4][d], at 10-38 to 10-38.4 nn.77.1 to .9.
48. 112 S. Ct. 1522 (1992).
49. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol43/iss1/2
FOREWORD
enacted a Beachfront Management Act, declaring that the coastal dune
and beach system of South Carolina serves a number of important pub-
lic purposes, including (1) the protection of life and property by acting
as a storm barrier; (2) the establishment of a habitat for wildlife and
endangered species; and (3) the improvement of the tourism industry of
the State. The Act declared that the South Carolina beaches were criti-
cally eroding and that certain types of construction endangered the
dune system and created ecological damage that threatened the public
purposes sought to be protected by the Act. The Act established cer-
tain setback requirements, prohibiting reconstruction of dwellings sea-
ward of the setback lines, particularly following natural disasters. The
plaintiff owned two vacant oceanfront lots, both seaward of the statuto-
rily prescribed lines. The only permanent structures capable of being
erected on the lots were a small deck or walkway. The trial court
found that the plaintiff had suffered an unconstitutional, uncompen-
sated taking and awarded Lucas $1,232,387.50. The South Carolina
Supreme Court reversed, finding that the Beachfront Management Act
came within the nuisance exception to the compensation requirement.
The exception provides that no taking occurs and no need to pay com-
pensation arises when the government acts to prevent use of property
that creates a public harm. As Richard Frank properly notes, the dis-
sent in the lower court adopts the position of Chief Justice Rehnquist
in his dissenting opinion in Keystone Bituminous Coal Association :50
regardless of the public harm prevented, an owner is entitled to com-
pensation when he is deprived of all economic uses of his property.
The majority opinion, written by Justice Scalia and joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, O'Connor, and Thomas, held
that the South Carolina Supreme Court applied an erroneous standard
in finding for the state of South Carolina. It reversed and remanded for
a state court determination whether, on the facts, an unconstitutional
taking had occurred. In reaching its decision, the Court noted that the
situations where government regulations result in the total loss of eco-
nomic value are relatively rare, but then restated an earlier rule in even
more strident fashion. "When the owner of real property has been
called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial use in the name of
the common good, that is, to leave his property economically idle, he
has suffered a taking."51 As Richard Frank notes, calling attention to
50. 480 U.S. 470, 506 (1987).
51. 112 S. Ct. at 2895.
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the dissent offered by Justice Stevens, earlier cases had never gone that
far.
In addition to its overbroad statement on regulatory takings, the ma-
jority limits the application of the usage exception to recognized cate-
gories of nuisances under preexisting state property law. Justices
Blackmun and Stevens submitted dissenting opinions, challenging both
the majority's conclusion and its reading of earlier takings cases. Jus-
tice Kennedy's concurrence focuses on the majority's comments on the
nuisance exception. Justice Souter's separate statement argues that
certiorari was improvidently granted because South Carolina had en-
acted an amendment to the Act immediately following the court's ini-
tial decision.
Though both Yee and Lucas resulted in remand, the impact of Lucas
on future developments in the taking doctrine are both ominous and
unpredictable. Richard Frank's analysis of the "denominator" issue,
which addresses what constitutes a taking when the owner holds multi-
ple parcels, is particularly appropriate in the Lucas case where the par-
ties allege a total loss of value. The author also addresses the
significant issue of the meaning of "economic use" and the question of
what precisely the plaintiff is deprived - a right or a privilege.
The earlier requirement of balancing of public purposes against pri-
vate interests in takings cases seems to have been lost, and the Court
barely mentions that South Carolina has both economic and safety
grounds for the regulation of beachfront development. The impact on
private property appears to be the primary concern, rather than the
sound regulatory purpose of legislation based on the traditional exer-
cise police power. Richard Frank's prediction that the court's decision
will lead to more regulatory taking litigation and that such litigation
will be even less predictable in its outcome is well founded.5"
This observer concludes that the entire regulatory taking doctrine
was a mistake from its very beginning in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon." That case created the doctrine in Holmes' usual epigram-
matic style that "while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if
regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking."54 As usual,
Oliver Wendall Holmes' language and his epigrammatic conclusions
52. Cf. First Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles,
482 U.S. 304 (1987); GRAD, supra note 1, § 10.01[4][d].
53. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
54. Id. at 415.
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sound more persuasive than is warranted by their sense. 5 The deci-
sion in Pennsylvania Coal was probably wrong and created a problem
for the sound exercise of the police power for the next seventy years.
The seventy-year-old error is likely to be compounded by the current
Supreme Court.
Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis,56 a five-to-
four decision, cast doubt on the continuing force of the Pennsylvania
Coal decision by upholding modem legislation which largely paralleled
the law that Justice Holmes held to have resulted in a taking. Justice
Stevens wrote the majority opinion which severely criticized Holmes'
language, as well as his holding in Pennsylvania Coal. Justice Stevens
emphasized the aspects of the law that protected "the public interest in
health, the environment, and the fiscal integrity of the area. That pri-
vate individuals erred in taking a risk cannot estop the Commonwealth
from exercising its police power to abate activity akin to a public nui-
sance.""7 In Keystone Bituminous Coal Association, Chief Justice
Rehnquist joined by Justices Powell, O'Connor, and Scalia, dissented,
asserting that there was a taking. In Lucas, Justice Scalia, Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist, and Justice O'Connor, the dissenters in Keystone Bitu-
minous Coal Association, together with Justices White and Thomas,
comprise the majority, marking a significant, sixty-five year backward
move in the application of the regulatory taking doctrine. The Court's
decision advances private property interests at the expense of sound
police power protections of public health, public safety, the environ-
ment, and public economic interests.
NPDES PERMITS AND THE PROTECTION OF DOWNSTREAM
"AFFECTED" STATES
In Watching the River Flow: The Prospects for Improved Interstate
Water Pollution Control, Robert L. Glicksman deals with the recurring
experience that rivers flow downstream and in so doing cross state
lines. Thus, pollution moves from a source state to an affected state, as
was the case in Arkansas v. Oklahoma. 8 Having obtained an NPDES
permit, the City of Fayetteville, Arkansas built a new municipal waste-
water treatment plant which ultimately emptied its effluent into a
55. For an example of Holmes' language and "epigrammatic conclusions" see Buck
v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) ("Three generations of idiots are enough.").
56. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
57. Id. at 488.
58. 112 S. Ct. 1046 (1992).
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scenic river in downstream Oklahoma. The Court addressed EPA's
finding that discharges from Arkansas' treatment plant would not
cause a detectable violation of Oklahoma's water quality standards. A
unanimous Court found that EPA satisfied the agency's duty to protect
the interests of the downstream state.
The parties argued three issues: First, whether the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) requires application of the water
quality standards of a downstream state when EPA issues a permit;
second, if the FWPCA does not require the application of the down-
stream affected state's standards, does the statute authorize EPA to
require such compliance; and third, whether the Court should uphold
the Tenth Circuit's finding that the FWPCA prohibits the discharge of
additional effluents into a body of water that already fails to meet the
water quality standard. The Court held that the Tenth Circuit's deter-
mination of the third issue was incorrect, and that EPA had the power
to construe the Act so as to mandate Arkansas' compliance with the
downstream state's standards. The Court upheld EPA's interpretation
relying once again on Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources De-
fense Council,5 9 deferring to an agency's interpretation of a statute be-
cause the law itself was unclear and the agency's interpretation not
unreasonable.
The Court's affirmance of EPA on the second issue had the great
advantage of relieving the Court from having to answer the first issue,
as to whether the FWPCA obligates EPA to apply the water quality
standards of the downstream state in issuing an NPDES permit.
It is the answer to this first issue that forms the substance of Robert
Glicksman's article. His painstaking analysis of available choices and
of the means available to resolve the issue concludes that the FWPCA
does require the source state to consider the downstream state's water
quality in deciding whether to issue a permit. Glicksman's article also
analyzes judicial, administrative, and legislative methods of accom-
plishing that result and shows the unfortunate consequences of having
the source state's standards control the impact of pollutants on the en-
tire river downstream. Further, the article, through its careful and ex-
tended analysis, exposes the Supreme Court's superficial disposition of
the case.
Like skilled escape artists, the Court took the easy route. The inter-
pretational ploy used by Justice Stevens, who is usually a careful crafts-
59. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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man, was to apply the Chevron rule of deference without analysis and
without questioning the appropriateness of its application in this in-
stance. Having found that the statute itself gave no precise guidance
on the second issue, whether EPA had the power to require Arkansas
to comply with Oklahoma standards, the Court held that the text was
in doubt and that consequently it could follow the agency's lead if the
agency's determination was not unreasonable. In so doing, the Court
did not searchingly examine the statute, nor did it explore the precise
situation presented. The Court failed to note that in answering the
question, EPA determined and expanded its own jurisdiction. One of
the rule's closest analysts criticized this use of Chevron as an unaccept-
able application of the deference rule.' It is evident that deference
saves the Court time and allows it to forego difficult tasks of statutory
interpretation.6 1 The Court avoids a difficult question despite the im-
portance of the issue. It refers to its own decision in International Pa-
per Co. v. Ouellette,62 which involved a private claim for the damages
caused by source state pollution in an affected state. There, the Court
held that the only state law applicable to an interstate discharge is the
law of the state in which the point source is located. There, the Court
expressly added that the downstream affected state does not have the
authority to block the issuance of the NPDES permit. The Court's
distinction of Ouellette in Arkansas v. Oklahoma is neither clear nor
convincing, and the disposition by reference to Chevron deference
seems particularly inappropriate.
THE COMMERCE CLAUSE, PREEMPTION, AND THE DISPOSAL OF
HAZARDOUS WASTE
In The Preemption of State Hazardous and Solid Waste Regulations:
The Dormant Commerce Clause Awakens Once More, Michael P.
Healy analyzes the decisions in Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v.
Hunt 63 and Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Depart-
ment of Natural Resources." In Chemical Waste Management, Inc.,
60. See Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L.
REv. 2071, 2099-2100 (1990).
61. See Peter L. Strauss, 150 Cases per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme
Court's Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REv.
1093, 1117-29 (1987).
62. 479 U.S. 481 (1987).
63. 112 S. Ct. 2009 (1992).
64. 112 S. Ct. 2019 (1992).
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Justice White, writing for the entire Court except Chief Justice Rehn-
quist, invalidated an Alabama statute that imposed a special additional
fee on the operator of the Emelle, Alabama hazardous waste disposal
facility for each ton of hazardous waste deposited at the facility "gener-
ated outside of Alabama." The operator of the facility sued, challeng-
ing the constitutionality of the fee as applied to out-of-state waste. The
facts of the case disclose that the fee was of great importance to Ala-
bama because Emelle, one of the few facilities receiving hazardous
waste in that region, received substantial amounts of out-of-state waste,
thus subjecting Alabama to a significant regulatory burden. The Court
invalidated the fee, applying a per se rule against state regulation that
discriminates against out of state commerce. The Court relied on Phil-
adelphia v. New Jersey,65 which found that waste is an article of com-
merce subject to the Commerce Clause, and that hazardous waste is
simply a more dangerous classification of that article of commerce.
The burden was on Alabama to justify the special fee, both in terms of
the local benefits and the unavailability of nondiscriminatory alterna-
tives adequate to preserve the local interest.66 Alabama's attempt to
justify the fee on the grounds of protection of health and safety of Ala-
bama citizens failed because similar considerations applied to local as
well as out-of-state hazardous waste. As Chief Justice Rehnquist noted
in dissent, the Court's decision means that the state must either pro-
hibit all landfill operations or it must accept waste from every portion
of the United States. Rehnquist scorned the "perverse regulatory in-
centives" created by the majority opinion. Michael Healy properly
concludes that in spite of Chief Justice Rehnquist's cavils, the addi-
tional fee was impermissible protectionist legislation. Professor Healy
provides a more persuasive and rational basis for the Court's decision.
The other case analyzed by Professor Healy, Fort Gratiot, focused on
several different factors. The Fort Gratiot decision concerned a com-
prehensive state program for waste disposal known as the Michigan
Solid Waste Management Act. The Act was amended to establish
waste import restrictions, preventing a waste disposal facility from ac-
cepting waste not generated in the county in which the disposal area is
located, unless the disposal is explicitly authorized in the county solid
waste management plan. Both the district court and the Sixth Circuit
rejected the assertion that the Michigan Solid Waste Management Act
imposed undue burdens on interstate commerce, because the burdens
65. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
66. Chemical Waste Management, Inc., 112 S. Ct. at 2014.
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imposed on out-of-state waste were no different than the burden im-
posed on in-state waste.
Reversing the court below, Justice Stevens, writing for seven mem-
bers of the Court, with a dissent by Chief Justice Rehnquist joined by
Justice Blackmun, found that the Michigan Act was protectionist and
required proof that the restrictions on the import of waste furthered
health and safety concerns that could not be adequately served by non-
discriminatory alternatives. The dissent viewed the statute as a law
that appropriately responded to local concerns with only incidental ef-
fects on interstate commerce.
The Court's opinion asserts that the statute afforded local waste pro-
ducers protection from competition from out-of-state producers. Chief
Justice Rehnquist rebutted this position, arguing that the regulation
actually increased the cost of disposal to local waste generators who
will not realize the economies of scale that the added disposal of out-of-
county waste would bring.
Michael Healy appropriately analyzes the statute from the point of
view of its contribution to the resolution of the problem of sufficient
landfill capacity. His analysis of the Michigan statute shows that
Michigan did not deprive out-of-staters of disposal space because
Michigan itself created that space through its own legislative efforts.
Neither the majority nor the dissent noted the element of responsibility
incorporated in the Michigan legislation, concluding that those respon-
sible for a problem are responsible for its resolution and may make far-
reaching regulations so long as it does not go beyond the needs of the
problem's resolution.
Analyzing the range of the state's choices in the Michigan situation,
and analyzing aspects of state economic policy that must be brought to
bear on their resolution, Michael Healy properly characterizes the
Court's reactive and almost mechanical response in dormant com-
merce clause cases. He argues that neither the Court's resolution in
Fort Gratiot nor the application of the Pike balancing test67 resolves
what is an inherently national problem. He suggests, for instance, that
a state which has created excess landfill capacity by its own efforts at
67. The Pike test provides:
[Wihere the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public
interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld
unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the
putative local benefits.
Pike v. Bruce Church Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
1993]
Washington University Open Scholarship
26 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 43:3
source reduction and recycling could well restrict its availability to
other states that have not practiced similar thrift. The problem with
the decision in Fort Gratiot is that it reflects the Court's failure to per-
form the necessary work suggested by Healy's comment. Instead, we
have another Pavlovian response to the dormant commerce clause
stimulus.
COMPELLING THE GOVERNMENT TO CLEAN UP ITS
ENVIRONMENTAL MESSES - THE RECALCITRANT
HISTORY OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY WAIVERS
There are some 80,000 federal facilities in the United States, some
owned and some leased by the United States. These facilities range
from small buildings, parking lots, and rural and urban post offices to
sizeable office buildings, huge army posts and naval installations, in-
cluding huge federal installations for the production of nuclear arma-
ments and the disposal of radioactive waste. Federal installations,
similar to other public and private installations, generate substantial
amounts of waste. Because normally federal agencies do not impose
legal requirements on each other, federal installations operate with few
effective controls and sanctions and thus have managed to accumulate
superdimensional and hazardous messes. There are some exceptions,
however, because most federal buildings are located within cities and
use city services to remove their waste; such buildings even comply
with municipal requirements, although it may be difficult to find sanc-
tions to compel compliance.
The federal facilities' failure to comply creates peculiar anomalies.
Under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, for instance, states
are responsible for attaining and maintaining water quality stan-
dards.6" States are also charged with the responsibility of adopting
state implementation plans to attain the federally promulgated Na-
tional Ambient Air Quality Standards. 69 A federal facility that refuses
to comply with state emission limitations or fails to comply with water
quality standards may make it impossible for the state to comply with
federal requirements. Although federal law provides few effective rem-
edies against non-complying states,70 the achievement and mainte-
68. 33 U.S.C. § 1313.
69. 42 U.S.C. § 7410.
70. See, e.g., EPA v. Brown, 431 U.S. 99 (1977), reversing Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d
827 (9th Cir. 1975). The 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, as a sole sanction, deprive
noncomplying states of certain highway and other government funds. 42 U.S.C. § 7509.
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nance of healthful, ambient air and water quality standards is a matter
of overwhelming national importance. Compliance by federal facilities
is ultimately necessary to achieve the goals of environmental
legislation.
In Overcoming Interpretative Formalism: Legislative Reversals of Ju-
dicial Constructions of Sovereign Immunity Waivers in the Environmen-
tal Statutes, Robert V. Percival recalls the sad history of the past fifteen
years' efforts by Congress to waive sovereign immunity and to compel
federal facilities to comply with state and local environmental require-
ments. The last chapter in this sorry cat and mouse game played be-
tween the U.S. Congress and the Supreme Court was U.S. Department
of Energy v. Ohio7 in which the Court held that sovereign immunity
bars the states from collecting civil penalties from federal facilities
which violate the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)
or the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA). Despite
clearly expressed congressional intent, short of saying "We really mean
it," the Court again relied on the oft repeated rule that waivers of sov-
ereign immunity must be unequivocal and must be construed strictly in
favor of the sovereign. Though the Court found that states are persons
authorized to sue federal facilities under the citizen suit provision, it
held that Congress did not waive sovereign immunity with respect to
civil penalties. The dissenters, Justice White joined by Blackmun and
Stevens, stated that a clearer statement of federal intent was not possi-
ble. The majority differentiated the federal facilities provision of the
Clean Water Act from those of RCRA, finding that the Clean Water
Act is substantially less effective in its waiver of sovereign immunity
because it does not make any specific reference to sanctions to enforce
injunctive relief. The analysis of the FWPCA provisions is even more
abstruse and contrived than the Court's analysis of the RCRA waiver.
As in past instances of Supreme Court misinterpretation of the sov-
ereign immunity waiver provisions, an effort at a legislative fix was not
long in coming. On October 6, President Bush signed the Federal Fa-
cility Compliance Act of 1992, which sought to undo the damage
caused by the Court's enforcement of the law against federal facilities
under RCRA. The correction of the Court's destruction of the
FWPCA waiver provision, however, will have to await the next round
of revision and reauthorization of the Federal Water Pollution Control
See also Delaware Valley Citizens Council for Clean Air v. Pennsylvania, 533 F. Supp.
869, 881 (E.D. Penn. 1982).
71. 112 S. Ct. 1627 (1992).
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Act. As Robert Percival indicates, the Federal Facility Compliance
Act of 1992 reflects a number of legislative compromises. In his de-
tailed analysis of the Act, the author cautiously refrains from speculat-
ing on the outcome of the inevitable next round when the clarity of the
waiver of sovereign immunity provision reaches the Supreme Court.72
The emphasis in the Court's opinion on technical aspects of sover-
eign immunity fails to explicate the significance of the case and its as-
pect of major public danger. For several years, the Department of
Energy operated its uranium processing plant in Fernald, Ohio for the
production of warheads. It was not a fastidious operation, and nuclear
waste materials polluted the surrounding waterways and soil. In 1986,
the surrounding neighborhood and the state demanded a cleanup. The
State of Ohio sued the Department of Energy for violations of state and
federal pollution laws, including the CWA and RCRA. The State of
Ohio sought to compel a multimillion dollar cleanup.
LEGAL FEES IN CITIZEN Surrs: SHORTCHANGING THE
COMMITTED
In Decreasing Incentives To Enforce Environmental Laws: City of
Burlington v. Dague,73 Michael Axline analyzed the decision to pro-
hibit courts from applying an enhancement factor in fee awards to pre-
vailing plaintiffs in environmental citizen suits. Such fee awards are
authorized by statute indicating the congressional policy to encourage
citizen participation in the enforcement of environmental laws. Such
fee awards are counter to the well-established American rule that each
party pays its own legal fees. Conservative courts prefer to adhere to
the old, common law rule, but Congress clearly indicated its policy
intentions by including citizen suit and fee award provisions in virtu-
ally every piece of environmental legislation, as well as by its enact-
ment of the Equal Access to Justice Act. Michael Axline, who co-
directs one of the nation's most successful environmental litigation
clinics at the University of Oregon Law School, is thoroughly familiar
with the importance of the provision of fee awards to environmental
litigators. His own experience demonstrates that citizen enforcement
efforts depend on the availability of such awards.
The question in Dague was not the award of the fee itself, but its
72. For earlier efforts to waive sovereign immunity, see GRAD, supra note 1,
§§ 2.05[4], 3.03[7][f].
73. City of Burlington v. Dauge, 112 S. Ct. 2638 (1992).
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enhancement to compensate the attorney for the contingent nature of
the recovery of such fees. The amount of the fees is not fixed in the
citizen suit provisions but must be set by the court to determine the
successful attorney's proper hourly rate. The recovery of such a fee is
therefore entirely contingent on success in the litigation. Unless the
contingent nature of the fee is recognized in the amount of the award,
it is less probable that attorneys will bring citizen suits.
In rejecting fee enhancements to account for the contingent nature of
the recovery, the Court refused to follow the rationale of five Justices in
Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizen's Council for Clean Air (II).'
In Delaware Valley II, Justices White, Powell, and Scalia and Chief
Justice Rehnquist held that enhancement of the lodestar fee (i.e., the
reasonable hourly rate times the number of hours spent) is never
proper under section 304(d) of the Clean Air Act because it compen-
sates attorneys not for success in one case but for failure in others.
Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, however, argued
that fee enhancement was required to ensure a reasonable fee for pre-
vailing plaintiffs' attorneys. Justice O'Connor joined the plurality in
the result and denied enhancement of the fee, holding that the upward
adjustment was not warranted in that case. O'Connor asserted, how-
ever, that enhancement for contingency is not foreclosed under either
section 304(d) of the Clean Air Act or other fee shifting statutes. In-
stead, she would impose restraints on courts' discretion in setting attor-
neys fees and would regard as controlling the manner in which the
market compensates for contingency. Hence, Justice O'Connor would
require the fee applicant to bear the burden of proving the degree to
which the relevant market compensates for contingent fee arrange-
ments, basing the enhancement on the situation of the market, preclud-
ing enhancement based on factors peculiar to the case. Thus, though
the attorney in Delaware I1 was not awarded an enhancement, five out
of the nine Justices in the case found that a fee enhancement reflecting
the contingent nature of the case was available and should be consid-
ered. The purpose of the enhancement is to ensure that plaintiffs will
find counsel. Five years later in Dague, however, the alinement shifted
and Justice Scalia, in an opinion joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices White, Souter, Kennedy, and Thomas, held enhancement to be
improper. The dissent by Justice Blackmun was joined by Justice Ste-
vens; Justice O'Connor filed a separate dissent.
Michael Axline's analysis indicates the Court's error in defining the
74. 483 U.S. 711 (1987).
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nature of the contingency that the contingency award is designed to
recognize. The Court's opinion mistakenly suggests that contingency
enhancement encourages the bringing of nonmeritorious cases. More-
over, the Scalia opinion entirely misses the purpose of contingency en-
hancements. The purpose is not to compensate plaintiffs' attorneys for
cases previously lost, but rather to serve as an incentive for attorneys to
accept the risk of cases where payment will occur only if they prevail.
Because risk of loss is only one of the contingencies an environmental
lawyer faces, the second risk, namely the amount of the award, is of
great significance in whether or not citizen enforcement - a congres-
sional policy - will happen at all. Environmental law has long had a
"movement" character, with idealistic, committed lawyers undertaking
the assertion of environmental rights when there is relatively little as-
surance of reward. The Supreme Court's position on the issue of con-
tingency enhancements runs contrary to clear congressional policy and
to the best interests of law enforcement. By all accounts, the recoveries
under citizen suit provisions in environmental litigation have been very
modest in comparison to the fees in civil litigation of similar difficulty.
The majority of the Court condemns environmental attorneys in citi-
zen suits to second class status.
FEDERAL PREEMPTION AS A BARRIER TO STATE COMMON LAW
CLAIMS FOR INJURIES FROM CIGARETTE SMOKING
In Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.," the Supreme Court turned back
an effort by defendant cigarette manufacturers to use the Cigarette La-
beling Act as a shield against a damage action for injury suffered as a
result of lifetime cigarette smoking. The claim brought in federal court
under diversity jurisdiction alleged a number of common law causes of
action. It alleged that defendants failed to inform the consumers ade-
quately of the health risks of smoking and sought to neutralize the ef-
fect of federally mandated health warning through their advertising
and public relations campaigns. In addition, the claim asserted that
defendants knowingly misrepresented the health hazards of smoking,
withholding medical and scientific evidence of smoking hazards from
the public. The defendant cigarette companies relied on the Federal
Labeling Act's preemption provision as a defense to all of the plaintiff's
claims arising after the 1965 effective date of the Labeling Act.
Although the Supreme Court found that reliance on preemption did
75. 112 S. Ct. 2608 (1991).
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not fully protect the defendants, it also held that the plaintiff is not
entirely free to assert common law claims. The Court held that the Act
clearly preempted state and federal rulemaking authorities from man-
dating particular cautionary statements. The Court, however, did not
conclude that all common law actions arising out of injuries or relating
to injuries from cigarette smoking were free of preemption. A plurality
of the Court, including Justice Stevens, the writer of the Courts' opin-
ion, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices White and O'Connor, con-
cluded that section 5(b) of the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of
1969 extends the section's preemptive reach beyond state enactments of
cautionary statements to include some common law damage actions.
The language of the statute extends to "requirement or prohibition[s]"
"imposed under state law"; such language appears to contemplate
common law as well as statutes and regulations. Accordingly, on re-
mand, the precise language of section 5(b) must be narrowly construed
in light of the presumption against preemption, and the plaintiff's com-
mon law claims must be examined to determine whether or not they
are in fact preempted.
Petitioner's causes of action, relying on failure to warn, require a
showing that defendants' post-1969 advertising or promotions should
have included additional or more clearly stated warnings. Thus, if
these claims rely on a state law "requirement or prohibition... with
respect to... advertising or promotion," within the meaning of section
5(b), they are preempted. On the other hand, a viable claim for breach
of express warranty is not preempted simply because it depends on the
contractual terms of the warranty rather than any state law
requirement.
Section 5(b) preempts state "prohibitions" as well as "require-
ments." Thus, the plaintiff's fraudulent misrepresentation claim, based
on state law prohibition against advertising and promotional state-
ments tending to minimize smoking health hazards, is preempted.
However, plaintiff's claims of intentional fraud by false representation
and concealment of material fact are not preempted because they do
not depend on advertising and promotion covered by the Act. More-
over, plaintiff's claim alleging a conspiracy among defendants to mis-
represent or conceal material facts concerning smoking health hazards
is also not preempted because the duty to abstain from conspiracy to
commit fraud is not a prohibition "based on smoking and health"
within the meaning of the phrase in section 5(b).
Justice Scalia joined by Justice Thomas concluded that all of peti-
tioner's common law claims are preempted by the 1969 Act. Justice
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Blackmun, joined by Justice Kennedy and Justice Souter concluded
that none of the plaintiff's common law actions are barred. The effect
of the Court's determination raised considerable doubt whether any
common law action relating to injuries arising out of cigarette smoking
could reasonably succeed. In spite of the narrow construction of pre-
emptive language, the true result of the Supreme Court's decision is to
ensure that very few common law actions ever make it into court.
Shortly after the decision by the Supreme Court, the news media re-
ported that the plaintiff in Cipollone had withdrawn the case.
In his analysis, Allan Kanner in Tort Law in the Regulatory Age uses
the case as the basis for a broad analysis of the use of federal statutes to
preempt state common law tort claims. Kanner attempts to compare
the use of federal statutes to preempt state common law tort claims to
cases challenging the constitutionality of punitive damages in civil
cases. The power of punitive damages has been the target of the pur-
ported "tort law reform" efforts of the past twelve years aimed at pro-
tecting industry through legislation that prevents certain damage issues
from reaching the jury or by placing caps on recoveries for pain and
suffering or for punitive damages. In Cipollone and similar cases, the
effort was to prevent the damage issue from reaching the jury by using
defendant's compliance with the labeling requirements of the federal
law as a barrier to state tort claims. In this case, more a case in prod-
uct liability than environmental protection, the court gave such an ex-
cessive reading to federal preemption in the Public Health Cigarette
Smoking Act of 1969 as to place all common law remedies in doubt. In
effect, federal legislation to protect the public health is successfully
used as a barrier to asserting private claims for health injuries. The
decision limits plaintiffs' access to the courts, constituting a substantial
victory for the cigarette manufacturers. As Kanner points out, the
court could have minimized its job by simply relying on Silkwood v.
Kerr-McGee Corp.7 6
CONCLUSION
The 1991-92 term of the Supreme Court was an environmental disas-
ter that may take years of environmental lawyers' efforts to undo. The
articles that follow should be used as the beginning of an undertaking
to turn around the Court's hostility to citizen suits; the Court's prefer-
ence for executive power to defeat legislative protections of the envi-
76. 464 U.S. 238 (1984).
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ronment; the Court's use of federal preemption to thwart sound
exercises of state police power; the Court's use of commerce power to
favor the interest of major waste disposal businesses against state ef-
forts to protect both the environment and health and safety in the
workplace; the Court's narrow view of standing, preventing sound
cases from ever being heard; and to turn around the Court's attenuated
view of sovereign immunity waivers reflecting intentional obtuseness to
block the recognition of clear congressional intent to allow the full en-
forcement of environmental law even against the federal government
itself.
This foreward is a pleading. The proof - and the beginning of the
work that must again be done - is in the articles that follow.
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